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Abstract 
,Q WKLV DUWLFOH ZH WHVW 3XWQDP¶V FODLP WKDW RQOLQH LQWHUDFWLRQV DUH
unable to foster social capital by examining the formation of bridging 
and boQGLQJVRFLDOFDSLWDOLQRQOLQHQHWZRUNV8VLQJ%XUW¶VFRQFHSWVRI
closure and brokerage as indicators, we observe networks formed 
through online interactions and test them against several theoretical 
PRGHOV:HWHVW3XWQDP¶VFODLPXVLQJ7ZLWWHUGDWDIURPWhree events: 
the Occupy movement in 2011, the IF Campaign in 2013, and the 
Chilean Presidential Election of the same year. Our results provide the 
first evidence that online networks are able to produce the structural 
features of social capital. In the case of bonding social capital, online 
ties are more effective in forming close networks than theory predicts. 
However, bridging social capital is observed under certain conditions, 
for example, in the presence of organizations and professional 
brokers. This latter finding provides additional evidence for the 
argument that social capital follows similar patterns online and offline. 
Keywords 
social capital, Twitter, network simulation, closure, brokerage, social 
media 
Introduction 
3XWQDP¶V  WKHVLV RXWOLQLng the decline of social capital in the United 
States re-invigorated one of the most enduring debates and research agendas 
in political science and elsewhere. His central argument that social 
connections are vital for the sustainability and stability of a democratic 
society elevated social capital from the individual or group level of analysis 
(Putnam, 1994, 2001) to an understanding of how social capital affects 
political institutions. His thesis has been taken up by scholars studying social 
capital in a variety of national contexts (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Colletta & 
Cullen, 2000; Claridge, 2004; Hooghe & Stolle, 2003; Pinchotti & Verwimp, 
2007) and has been subject to numerous revisions and rejoinders (Sobel, 
2002; Tzanakis, 2013). Twenty years on from PutQDP¶V LQLWLDO SXEOLFDWLRQ
the debate over social capital shows no sign of abating, instead taking on a 
new dimension²the development of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs). 
The explosion of ICTs has transformed inter-personal communications 
and, consequently, has affected the ways in which people create and maintain 
social connections. In particular, social media has brought new questions to 
the field of social capital and, despite widespread interest, the literature has 
not always kept pace. Work in this field has focused primarily on 
understanding the role of social connections formed²or maintained²
through the Internet (Bond et al., 2012; Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2006; 
Gibson, Howard, & Ward, 2000; Kavanaugh & Patterson, 2001; Margetts, 
John, Escher, & Reissfelder, 2011; Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001; Wellman, 
Haase, Witte, & Hampton, 2001; Williams, 2006). Most of the research 
assessing the relationship between these new technologies and social capital 
assumes that the ties formed through online platforms carry a similar quantity 
and quality of resources (i.e., social capital) to relationships formed offline; 
however, this assumption has not been explicitly tested. 
The aim of this article is twofold. First, to test the formation of the 
structural signatures of social capital online by analyzing online social 
networks. Here, we are interested in the relationship between social media 
and social capital formation, specifically how connections established via 
social media²in this case Twitter²lead to the formation of two specific 
forms of social capital, bridging and bonding capital. Our test here is 
explicitly structural. We examine the architecture of social networks, but not 
the content or quality of the links. As such, it marks a first and necessary test 
of whether there is evidence for online social capital. Second, we consider the 
relative importance of bridging and bonding capital. This is of special interest 
because one of the advantages of ICTs is to connect otherwise unconnected 
people, suggesting we might expect to see a different interplay between the 
two types of social capital than we see in face-to-face world interactions. 
The distinction between bonding and bridging social capital as 
popularized by Putnam (2001) is one that is well-known and developed, but 
worth briefly rehearsing here. Bonding social capital exists in the strong ties 
occurring within, often homogeneous, groups²families, friendship circles, 
work teams, choirs, criminal gangs, and bowling clubs, for example. Bonding 
social capital not only acts as a social glue, building trust, and norms within 
groups but also potentially increasing intolerance and distrust of out-group 
members. Bridging social capital exists in the ties that link otherwise 
separate, often heterogeneous, groups²so, for example, individuals with ties 
to other groups, messengers, or more generically the notion of brokers. 
Bridging social capital allows different groups to share and exchange 
information, resources, and help coordinate action across diverse interests. 
Putnam emphasizes that these are not either/or categories, but that in well-
functioning societies the two types or dimensions develop together. 
Similar to other studies (Coleman, 1988; Shen, Monge, & Williams, 
2014 ZH XVH %XUW¶V  VWUXFtural notion of social capital and two 
associated metrics, closure and brokerage, as indicators of bonding and 
bridging social capital, respectively. Closure refers to the level of 
connectedness between particular groups of members within a broader 
network and encourages the formation of trust and collaboration. Brokerage 
UHIHUVWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRIVWUXFWXUDOKROHVZLWKLQDQHWZRUNWKDWDUH³EULGJHG´
by a particular member of the network. Brokerage permits the transmission of 
information across the entire network. Social capital, then, is comprised of 
the combination of these two elements, which interact over time. We use the 
observed values for closure and brokerage over time and compare them with 
different simulations based on theoretical network models to show how they 
compare with what we would expect offline. From this, we evaluate the 
existence and formation of social capital in online networks. 
Using diverse-case criteria for case selection, we draw on Twitter data for 
three different events²the 2011 U.S. Occupy Movement, the U.K.-based IF 
Campaign organized by a coalition of U.K. non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) around hunger and the 2013 G8 meeting, and the 2013 Chilean 
Presidential Election. We analyze the networks created by the transmission of 
information from these events to identify patterns of social capital formation 
within/among their structural features. Our data show that, contrary to Putnam, 
online networks show evidence of social capital and these networks exhibit 
higher levels of closure than what would be expected based on theoretical 
models. However, the presence of organizations and professional brokers is key 
to the formation of bridging social capital. Similar to traditional (offline) 
conditions, bridging social capital in online networks does not exist organically 
and requires the purposive efforts of network members to connect across 
different groups. Finally, the data show that interaction between closure and 
brokerage goes in the right direction, moving and growing together. 
The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we briefly review the 
WKHRU\RIVRFLDOFDSLWDODQG3XWQDP¶VVNHSWLFLVPRIRQOLQHVRFLDOFDSLWDO:H
outline the two key indicators of online social capital used in this article, 
provide a brief review of the literature on network approaches to social 
interactions and on the role of organizations in collective action. Finally, we 
set out four research hypotheses derived from the theoretical discussion, and 
summarize the theoretical models that are used to test our hypotheses. The 
second section describes the methodology used to collect and analyze the 
data. The third section documents our results and provides a discussion of the 
main findings. The conclusion brings the article together and outlines fruitful 
directions for future research. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Social Capital Online? 
According to Putnam (2001), computer-mediated communication makes 
online interactions unsuitable for the formation of social capital for four 
principal reasons. First, face-to-face interactions carry much more contextual 
information than online interactions due to the high degree of non-verbal 
communication that accompanies face-to-face communication. Second, face-
to-face interactions can bring diverse people together, whereas online 
interactions take place among like-minded people, something he calls 
³F\EHUEDONDQLVDWLRQ´ 7KLUG RQOLQH LQWHUDFWLRQV GR QRW IRVWHU VRFLDO FDSLWDO
because of a digital divide in access to the Internet, which allows for the 
interaction of members of the elite and not the public in general. Fourth, the 
Internet has more potential to become a form of entertainment rather than 
communication. We take up each of these differences in turn, and set out 
why, a priori, online interactions may indeed foster the development of social 
capital. 
Putnam argues that online interactions are unable to foster social capital 
due to the absence of non-verbal cues and information, which form a large 
part of inter-personal communications. In the case of this first difference, we 
agree with Putnam: Offline interactions lack this fundamental feature. 
However, to our knowledge, no study has empirically shown the extent to 
which non-verbal communication is necessary for the formation of social 
capital or social trust and cooperation that flows from it. Second, with respect 
to cyberbalkanisation, recent research has shown (Brundidge & Rice, 2009) 
that Facebook groups and profiles allow the emergence of political 
discussions among people who disagree, particularly through the connection 
RI WZRSHUVRQVZKRKDYHD³IULHQG´ LQFRPPRQ0RUHRYHU UHVHDUFKE\ WKH
Pew Research Internet project has shown that only 4% of social media users 
block, unfriend, or hide someone on the site because they disagreed with 
something the user posted about politics (Rainie & Smith, 2012). In addition, 
research on Twitter has shown that, although people are more likely to 
interact with others who share the same views as they do during discussions 
on controversial topics, they are actively engaged with those with whom they 
disagree (Yardi & boyd, 2010). These trends, however, have been observed 
mainly after the rise of social networking sites which, contrary to the general 
use of the Internet which Putnam had in mind in 2000, have specific 
affordances that promote socialization and interaction. 
Rather than reinforce cyberbalkanisation, we argue that social media has 
the potential to facilitate discussion among different groups, particularly as 
online ties are not bound to their immediate communities creating the 
possibility of communication across traditional geographical boundaries. 
Online ties may facilitate communication among different individuals and 
groups because some of the initial barriers to communication in offline, face-
to-face communication (gender, race/ethnicity, disability) are rendered less 
visible. 
Although digital divide concerns persist, recent evidence shows a closing 
gap in access (Judge, Puckett, & Bell, 2006). Moreover, offline interactions 
do not provide any insurance for discussions outside of elites. Other factors, 
such as geographical segregation, may be far more relevant for social 
integration than Internet access. Finally, although some scholars (Morozov, 
2011FRQFXUZLWK3XWQDP¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH,QWHUQHW¶VJUHDWHUSRWHQWLDO for 
entertainment than communication, there is some evidence to show the 
,QWHUQHW¶V FRPPXQLFDWLYH DQG PRELOL]LQJ IRUFHV Ward & Gibson, 2009). 
This same assessment applies to offline organizations; joining organizations 
is not necessarily the same as interacting within those organizations. 
In sum, we see no a priori reason(s) that social capital cannot exist online. 
But do differences in the form, features, or characteristics of online and 
offline interactions produce different forms of social capital? We think it is 
plausible. For example, online ties may be based more on the transmission of 
information than the personal characteristics of those interacting, such as 
geographical location, gender, ethnicity, or even more importantly, who they 
know. Online ties may not be as stable or durable as those created face-to-
face, because of the dynamic nature of the Internet. The level of engagement 
required to create a tie online might be lower than the engagement required 
offline, which might also have consequences for the type of resources they 
can mobilize. Finally, the categorization of weak and strong ties as proposed 
by Granovetter (1973) might not operate in the same way: The strength of an 
online tie may be better measured by the quantity of interactions and the 
frequency and quality of the information it transmits, rather than the personal 
characteristics of those making the connection. 
Our aim in this article, however, is not to identify whether there are 
differences in online versus offline social capital, but to first establish 
evidence of social capital online. Like the bowling leagues that Putnam used 
to illustrate social capital offline, we argue that Twitter and Facebook 
discussions create social networks, operating under norms of trust and 
reciprocity, that are able to mobilize resources and information. In the next 
section, we examine the concepts of bonding and bridging social capital. 
Subsequently, we set out two theoretical models of social capital in online 
networks and drawing on these models, identify three hypotheses relating to 
the formation and structure of online networks. 
Observing Social Capital Online: Bridging and Bonding 
Social Capital 
The concept of social capital has traveled a long way since its original inception 
by Hanifan (1920), wKRGHVFULEHGVRFLDOFDSLWDODV³WKRVHWDQJLEOHVXEVWDQFHV
WKDWFRXQWIRUPRVWLQWKHGDLO\OLYHVRISHRSOH´S6LQFHWKHQDFFRUGLQJ
to Webber (2008), there has been two streams of development of the concept: 
neo-capital and communitarian theories of social capital. Neo-capitalists (e.g., 
Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 2005; Portes, 1998) are concerned with the relative 
advantage of a person within a group, that is, how the position of a person 
might bring them benefits in relation to the rest of the members of the network. 
This approach allows us to determine how the relationships we form are able to 
PRELOL]HUHVRXUFHVRUDV%RXUGLHXZRXOGSUHIHUKRZPXFK³FDSLWDO´ZHFDQ
acquire through our social connections. In the case of communitarian 
approaches, as exemplified by Putnam, they look at the aggregate benefits of 
social connections. This approach is less concerned about the individual gains 
of participating in a network and more about the societal outcomes of them. 
Within the communitarian approach, Putnam makes the distinction 
between bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital exists in 
tight-knit networks that foster intra-group, strong ties. Putnam calls it a 
³VRFLRORJLFDOVXSHUJOXH´DQGH[SODLQVWKDWLWLVXVHIXOWREXLOGWUXVWEHWZHHQ 
the members of the group and increases the levels of solidarity. Bonding 
social capital might also be responsible for creating exclusion against those 
outside the group, which becomes the negative dimension of social capital. 
Bonding ties are the natural result of homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, 
& Cook, 2001), where people who share similar relevant characteristics²
such as geographical location, religion, ideology, among others²tend to 
group and work together. The other dimension of social capital, bridging ties, 
or the connections that people form outside their circles. This is similar to 
what Granovetter (1973) FDOOHG ³ZHDN WLHV´ %ULGJLQJ VRFLDO FDSLWDO LV
responsible for coordinating action across different groups, and provides new 
information and resources to the more dense groups. Although both forms of 
social capital might be considered to be competing with one another, Putnam 
DUJXHV WKDW WKH\DUHQRW³HLWKHURU´FDWHJRULHV7KH\RSHUDWH LQFRRUGLQDWLRQ
and are different measurable dimensions of measure social capital.1 
To examine evidence of social capital online, we take up the work of Burt 
(2005) who introduces two key indicators of social capital: closure and 
brokerage. The latter refers to the existence of a gap between two social 
groups, known as a structural hole. Brokerage takes place when two different 
groups are connected by a single node. Being a broker allows a person to 
have a better overview of the network and to become the only point of 
contact between two or more groups; hence, she can control the flow of 
information and resources through that network. 
Social network structures consider the relationships built by people over 
time. These relationships can be dependent on contextual elements, such as 
work relations or, on a more personal level, friendship. Regardless of how we 
connect with others, the networks we build will have different structures. 
Some networks will be denser, with everyone in the group interacting with all 
of the other members (the basic definition of a cluster), whereas others will 
require someone to bridge different groups. The latter function of bridging is 
what we FDOO³EURNHUDJH´ 
Like Putnam, Burt (2005) argues that brokerage works in cooperation with 
closure (Coleman, 1988). That is, to broker something between two groups, 
each one has to host cohesive ties among their members, or some degree of 
closure. Conceptually, closure can mean different things depending on the 
network. In a group of friends, closure might mean trust, intimacy, or 
frequency of contacts; whereas in a group of colleagues, closure might mean 
that they share work on the same project or the same working space. In that 
sense, what we understand by closure may change depending on the type of 
social network we are observing. The important thing to consider is that 
closure allows a network to build trust among its members, by providing a 
safe environment for social relations. Hence, closure is essential for the 
creation of resources and information within a group, which in turn can be 
mobilized by a broker to another group. 
A useful example of closure provided in the literature (Christakis & 
Fowler, 2011) is the dynamics of military companies. A company of 100 
soldiers is usually composed of 10 groups of 10 soldiers each. It is important 
for the efficiency of the whole company that each group of 10 becomes very 
close and that everyone in the groups knows each other. But within group 
closure is not enough for the emergence of social capital. It is also important 
that each group has ties with members of the other groups, that is, what 
Granovetter (1973) ZRXOG FDOO ³ZHDN WLHV´ WR WUDQVPLW LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG
resources. Thus, it is the interplay of closure and brokerage that provides the 
company with an optimal level of social capital. 
As with the conjunction between closure and brokerage, the important 
element of social capital refers to a collective behavior based on trust and 
reciprocity. Putnam claims that the benefits of participating in voluntary 
associations are not only individual but also bring positive outcomes at a 
societal level. His distinction between bridging and bonding social capital 
takes the brokerage and closure discussion to an aggregate level by arguing 
that intra-group ties build trust and mobilize diverse resources. 
)URPDFRQFHSWXDOSRLQWRIYLHZ%XUW¶VFRQFHSWVRIFORVXUHDQGEURNHUDJH
offer a useful way of bringing the neo-capital and communitarian approaches to 
social capital together. Burt provides a clear conceptual definition that not only 
ILWVPRVWRI WKHHOHPHQWVRI3XWQDP¶VFDWHJRULHVEXWDOVRSURYLGHVDSDWK IRU
rationalizing them. Closure operates in the same way as bonding social capital, 
favoring intra-group ties, fostering the formation of trust and building dense 
communities. However, brokerage provides a fresh flow of new information to 
the network, allows for the mobilization of different resources, and uses the 
trust formed by closure to act as a tool for collective action. Our approach here 
KDV EHHQ WR GHPRQVWUDWH WKH VLPLODULW\ RI 3XWQDP¶V ERQGLQJ DQG EULGJLQJ
FDSLWDO DQG %XUW¶V FORVXUH DQG EURNHUDJH FRQFHSWV 7KXV ZH HPSOR\ %XUW¶V
measures as indicators of bonding and bridging capital at the aggregate level. A 
explanation of the differences between the approaches can be found in Table 1. 
Finally, the decision to use these concepts (brokerage and closure) as 
measures for bonding and bridging social capital stems from the need to 
provide better indicators for these concepts. Currently, measures of social 
capital are analyzed either using social network analysis or survey 
instruments such as the name generator (McCallister & Fischer, 1978), the 
position generator (Lin, 2008), and, more recently, the resource generator 
(Van Der Gaag & Snijders, 2005). Some researchers (Ellison, Steinfield, & 
Lampe, 2011 .ZRQ '¶$QJHOR 	 0F/HRG  KDYH DOVR XVHG VXUYH\
instruments to assess the presence of bonding and bridging social capital in 
online platforms. In our view, this kind of exercise introduces two sources of 
bias. On one hand, the use of self-reported data may lead to a 
misrepresentation of the actual networks. On the other hand, this type of data 
only allows for the analysis of ego-networks (i.e., the connections of a single 
node), and thus excludes the possibility of observing directly the interplay 
among different social groups. This concern has been shared by Appel et al. 
(2014), who emphasize the lack of validity of most survey instruments used 
to measure social capital in ICTs. 
Table 1. Distinction Between Neo-Capital and Communitarian Approaches in 
Terms of the Type of Ties Within a Network. 
 Focus Intra-group ties Inter-group ties 
Neo-capitalist  
approach 
Individual advantage  
of a person in a 
network 
Closure Brokerage 
Communitarian 
approach 
Aggregate benefits  
of networks 
Bonding social 
capital 
Bridging social 
capital 
In their recent article, Gibson and McAllister (2013) define bridging social 
capital as interacting with people from different ethnic backgrounds, ages, or 
countries and bonding social capital as interacting with family, close friends, 
or people with shared hobbies, religious beliefs, or political views. Their 
work uses survey-based, self-reported measures of social capital or, in other 
words, use ego-FHQWULFPHDVXUHVGHULYHGIURPWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VYLHZRIKRZ
he or she connects to the rest of the world. They show that only bonding 
social capital is significantly and positively related to political participation; 
bridging social capital is not correlated with political activities. We argue that 
the use of observed networks provides an unbiased opportunity for analyzing 
bonding and bridging social capital. 
We are interested in seeing whether our approach complements Gibson 
DQG0F$OOLVWHU¶VILQGLQJVHVSHFLDOO\EHFDXVHZHXVHDFWXDOQHWZRUN-
based measures of social capital, which they do not. Our measure is different 
and is derived empirically from the structure of the network. For us, a 
bridging tie is literally one that bridges between groups and bonding ties are 
ZLWKLQ JURXS OLQNV 7KLV PHDQV WKDW ZH GR QRW KDYH WR UHO\ RQ SHRSOH¶V
perceptions of whether the Internet allows them to form in-group or out-
group ties; we calculate this from the actual network of ties itself. What is of 
interest then is the extent to which our results complement theirs. 
The Role of Organizations in the Investigation of Online 
Social Capital 
Inspired by the classic work of de ToFTXHYLOOH  RQ ³'HPRFUDF\ LQ
$PHULFD´ Putnam (2001) places particular emphasis on the benefits of 
organizational membership for the creation of social capital. According to 
Putnam, organizational involvement can have important benefits for the 
community (and for democracy in general) by providing organization 
members with the necessary competencies for participation in public life, 
fostering the creation of social capital. Most crucially, organizational 
involvement has been shown to be an important antecedent not only of civic 
engagement and involvement in collective action (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) 
but also for the maintenance and enhancement of strong ties²especially 
among activist groups (McAdam, 1990). 
Recently, the extent to which organizations are required for collective 
action has been questioned. Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl (2012) argue that the 
SUHVHQFH RI ³RUJDQL]DWLRQ-OHVV RUJDQL]LQJ´ VXFK DV WKH SURWHVWV DJDLQVW WKH
WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999, is becoming increasingly common. That 
said, they do not ignore the role of formal organizations, noting how some 
organizations have been thriving by adapting to possibilities brought by new 
technologies. They argue that organizations are flexible, adaptive, and adopt 
new technologies over time. The key difference is that organizations are no 
longer both a necessary and sufficient condition for collective action, such as 
classical studies suggest (Olson, 1965). 
In line with that argument, some researchers (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) 
propose a new way to conceptualize collective action, which emphasizes the 
role of the connections among people, rather than the fact that they come 
together as a collective. In their view, collective action efforts can be framed 
in three different ways: (a) organizationally brokered collective action, which 
FRQWDLQV ³coalitions of heavily brokered relations among organizations´
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 13), namely, the role that traditional theory 
assigns to organizations; (b) organizationally enabled connective action, 
which refers to the presence of loosely tied organizations that allow for 
people to personalize their engagement; and (c) crowd-enabled connective 
action, where individuals connect by themselves using digital media 
platforms, and organizations play a peripheral role, if any at all. There is an 
important distinction to be drawn between the thinner view of connective 
action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) and the thicker view of social capital. 
Connective action is merely transactional. It allows people to organize. Social 
capital is transformational. It results in social externalities, thickening the 
social glue of trust and shared norms. To be clear, our approach here is to 
examine the social structure of connective action, which may or may not 
result in lasting social capital. We do not examine the content of online ties, 
which would allow us to assess the quality of the connections. We argue that 
our structural approach is a necessary, but not sufficient, first step to in 
assessing whether there is any evidence for online social capital. 
These changes pose an intriguing question about the role social media can 
play in the generation of social capital in the context of different 
RUJDQL]DWLRQDO VHWWLQJV ,QGHHG EDVHG RQ %HQQHWW DQG 6HJHUEHUJ¶V 
typology which distinguishes between different degrees of organizational 
involvement, we hypothesize that the level of brokerage and closure within 
networks of collective action should differ depending on the involvement of 
formal organizations within them. When their presence is central to the 
collective efforts, they play a role in moving information and resources 
across the networks. Thus, their absence leaves an open question on whether 
bridging connections could emerge without them. 
Hypotheses and Theoretical Models 
Drawing on the closure and brokerage concepts set out above, we test four 
hypotheses with regard to the structural features of online networks and how 
they relate to the formation of social capital. We analyze the levels of closure 
and brokerage from a set of online networks and compare them with both 
random simulations and the most common theoretical models used to explain 
the formation of social networks. We use the outcome from that exercise to 
test our four hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis is a baseline measure that aims to test whether the 
levels of brokerage and closure we observe online are the product of 
purposive efforts to interact, or if they are indistinguishable from any other 
random network with the same number of nodes and ties. Hence, we test the 
observed values we get from the online networks against random graphs. 
Although it is likely that they will differ, testing this hypothesis allows us to 
move forward and make an informed decision on whether the networks 
present a basic level of systematic social connections. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The levels of bridging and bonding social capital 
formed through online interactions are significantly different than random. 
To construct the random graphs, we use the first variant of the Erdos±
Renyi (ER) model, G(n, M), which assumes that a graph is randomly selected 
from all the different possibilities of graphs with a fixed number of nodes n 
and vertices M. Each node in the graph, then, has the same probability of 
being connected with any other node from the same graph. We assigned the 
fixed number of nodes and edges according to the observed information. For 
this hypothesis, we run two-sample t tests to compare the difference in means 
between the observed and the random networks. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The networks formed through online interactions are, 
on average, less dense and weaker than those generated by the theoretical 
models. 
7KLV K\SRWKHVLV WHVWV 3XWQDP¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW online ties are not able to 
produce social capital as face-to-face ties are. As building counterfactuals to 
online networks is an almost impossible task, we test the observed values we 
get from the online networks against two theoretical models that are 
commonly used to explain social networks formation: the Barabasi±Albert 
model and the Watts±Strogatz model. 
The Barabasi±Albert (BA) model is based on the notion of preferential 
attachment. That is, it starts an initial random graph and creates new nodes, 
one at a time. The main assumption is that nodes are more likely to connect 
with other nodes that are better connected. The aim of this model is to 
account for the level of influence of certain nodes in the network. Those who 
have more links will attract more to connect with them. Formally, the model 
starts with a network with m0 nodes. Each new node is connected to m d m0 
existing nodes with a probability that is proportional to the number of links 
that the existing nodes already have. The probability pi that the new node is 
connected to node i is 
 ,
i
i
j j
k
p
k
 ¦  (1) 
where ki is the degree of node i and the sum is made over all pre-existing 
nodes j. Heavily linked nodes tend to quickly accumulate even more links, 
whereas nodes with only a few links are unlikely to be chosen as the 
GHVWLQDWLRQ IRU D QHZ OLQN 7KH QHZ QRGHV KDYH D ³SUHIHUHQFH´ WR DWWDFK
themselves to the already heavily linked nodes. 
Finally, the WS model overcomes two main criticisms of the ER models. 
First, it accounts for the formation of triadic closure in a network²that is, if 
we have three nodes A, B, and C, where there are strong ties between A and 
C, and A and B, it is very likely that there will be a weak tie between B and C. 
Second, the degree distribution of ER models form a Poisson distribution, 
because it does not assume that highly connected nodes can link each other 
with higher likelihood. WS starts with a fixed number of nodes N connected 
with degree K (which needs to be an integer), each one connected in a 
circular lattice with its neighbors. Then, the model rewires each one of the 
edges of a node i with another node k with a probability E that each node will 
be selected. No self-loops or duplicated edges are allowed. The main 
advantage of this model is that it accounts for the small-world effect (i.e., 
even if most nodes are not neighbors to each other, they can be easily 
connected from every other with a small number of steps) by producing 
higher levels of clustering coefficient than the BA model. The BA model, 
however, produces more realistic degree distributions. 
The models use the information from the observed networks²such as the 
number of edges and vertices, or the average degree²to build their own 
networks. For each model (including the random graphs), we simulated a 100 
different random iterations of the graphs and calculated their average values 
for closure and brokerage. We used the observed graphs as a reference for the 
number of nodes and edges required for the calculation of the models. For 
H2, we compared the observed values against all the models. 
%DVHGRQ3XWQDP¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWRQOLQHLQWHUDFWLRQVDUHXQVXLWDEOHIRUWKH
formation of social capital, our expectation is for the observed clustering 
coefficient to be lower and the network constraint to be higher than in the 
theoretical models. In particular, we might expect cyberbalkanisation and the 
digital divide to restrict the formation of social capital in the three online 
networks we consider. 
We might expect tweets about the Occupy movement to be largely restricted 
to like-minded people, particularly those directly involved in it given the nature 
of protest movements. The potential for cyberbalkanisation is particularly high 
for the IF Campaign. Within the international development literature, it has 
been noted that levels of public engagement (in the United Kingdom) with 
issues of global poverty and development are low and declining (see Darnton & 
Kirk, 2011). As such, there is a high possibility that tweets about the NGO-
organized IF campaign are likely to be restricted to those already involved with 
these NGOs, rather than across the public more generally. Similarly, we would 
expect tweets about the Chilean Presidential election to take place among those 
that are already more politically engaged, and may be restricted to those with 
similar political views. 
In the case of the IF campaign and the Chilean Presidential elections, it is 
also important to note that targeting social network sites are part of the 
campaign strategy used by organizers. As such, much of the Twitter activity 
in these two networks is likely to be driven by organizations and professional 
brokers, restricting network formation to being concentrated around these 
brokers. As such, we would expect online network for the IF campaign to be 
centered around the NGOs and NGO staff members, rather than between 
members of the general public. The same would apply to the online network 
for the Chilean election campaign, which is likely to be constrained around 
political parties and activists. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): In online networks, bonding and bridging social 
capital operate in coordination, strengthening each other. 
To test this hypothesis, we used the observed values for each event and 
calFXODWH WKHLU FRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQW XVLQJ ERWK SDUDPHWULF 3HDUVRQ¶V R) 
and non-SDUDPHWULF .HQGDOO¶V W) tests. We expect to observe positive co-
variation between brokerage and closure. As Putnam explains, both forms of 
social capital²bridging and bonding²should operate in conjunction to 
produce a positive societal outcome. In empirical terms, that requires that the 
presence of both should be related, but not working against each other. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): In cases where organizations play a relevant role, we 
should expect higher levels of bridging social capital in relation to the 
different theoretical models. 
Bennett and Segerberg (2013) have provided a solid theoretical framework 
about how digital networking mechanisms embedded in the layers of 
networks can provide the means of coordinating actions. There are two 
important points here that are relevant to our analysis. First, communication 
within such networks can be thought of as an act of organization in 
technology-enabled networks. Second, a signature feature of this type of 
communication is the increased personalization of action online; that is, a 
form of engagement in which new media are used to carry personal stories 
and other content across networks. However, not all networks are the same; it 
is indeed conceivable that different content is communicated²in a different 
way and with different organizational signatures²across a network about an 
electoral campaign, a spontaneously organized demonstration against 
bankers, and a well-organized protest march as part of an ongoing 
humanitarian campaign. 
)ROORZLQJ %HQQHWW DQG 6HJHUEHUJ¶V W\SRORJ\ DQG WKLV JHQHUDO OLQH RI
argument about digitally networked action, we argue that social capital can 
be formed through technology-enabled interactions and observed not only 
through analyzing tweets to detect personalized action frames but also at the 
structural level. The receipt, adaptation, and communication of personalized 
action frames that can be widely shared across different networks, and 
subsequently enable discussion and further involvement with a particular 
campaign/cause, are likely to result in the development of social capital. 
However, depending on the type of network examined, we expect that 
different types of social capital development will be more prominent in some 
networks than others. In this particular case, we expect to find more bridging 
social capital in networks where organizations play a more central role. 
The expected outcomes for each hypothesis are shown in Table 2. 
Data and Method 
We draw on Twitter data to test the four hypotheses set out above across 
three different cases: the Occupy Movement in the United States (2011), the  
 
Table 2. Hypotheses and Expected Outcomes. 
Hypotheses Indicator Expected outcome 
H1: Observed networks  
are different than 
random 
Average local clustering 
coefficient and network 
constraint (t tests) 
z 
H2: Observed bridging  
and bonding social 
capital are lower than 
the theoretical models 
Average local clustering 
coefficient and network 
constraint 
<clustering coefficient, 
>network constraint 
H3: Closure and 
brokerage work in 
cooperation 
Correlation coefficient 
(Pearson and Kendall) 
+ 
H4: Bridging social capital  
is higher in 
organizations-led 
networks 
Average local clustering 
coefficient 
>in organization-led 
networks in relation to 
the theoretical models, 
and compared with the 
other cases 
Note. H1 = Hypothesis 1; H2 = Hypothesis 2; H3 = Hypothesis 3; H4 = Hypothesis 4. 
8.(QRXJK)RRGIRU(YHU\RQH³,)´JOREDOKXQJHUFDPSDLJQRUJDQL]HGE\
U.K.-based NGOs to coincide with the U.K. G8 meeting (2013) and the 
Chilean presidential elections (2013). The three cases have been chosen using 
D ³GLYHUVH-FDVH´ VHOHFWLRQ FULWHULD DURXQG RUJDQL]DWLRQDO SUHVHQFH 7KLV
approach is a departure from previous analyses of Twitter data which have 
focused on events similar in nature: for example, the use of Twitter for 
protests (González-Bailón, Borge-Holthoefer, Rivero, & Moreno, 2011), 
political campaigns (Vaccari et al., 2013), charitable campaigns (Clements, 
2011), or using the entire population of tweets for a certain time period 
(Morstatter, Pfeffer, Liu, & Carley, 2013). Drawing on Bennett and 
6HJHUEHUJ¶V  W\SRORJ\ RI FROOHFWLYH DFWLRQ WKH FDVHV QHWZRUNV
represent one of three observed types: (a) crowd-enabled connective action 
network, (b) organizationally brokered connective action network, and (c) 
organizationally enabled connective action network. Variation across the 
cases allows us to test our hypotheses across both spatial and temporal 
domains, and because the observed cases represent varying degrees of 
connective action, we can generalize findings here to the wider population. 
x OWS: Crowd-enabled connective action network. Previous research 
(Conover, Ferrara, Menczer, & Flammini, 2013; Fábrega & Sajuria, 
2014) has shown that this case is a prime example of this type of 
political activism. OWS activists showed reluctance to allow formal 
organizations to play a key role in the movement. Moreover, they 
emphasized the role of technology as the means for connection, rather 
than membership to organizations. This was to be expected from a 
public that was openly suspicious of processes that require delegation 
and, hence, handing over individual empowerment to others; 
technology-enabled networks as a means of connection provided for 
them a more neutral and self-empowering affiliation (Tufekci, 2014). 
x IF Campaign: Organizationally enabled connective action network. The 
IF campaign was the first campaign to be launched on Twitter by an 
umbrella group representing more than 200 NGOs. IF organizers 
continuously updated their hashtags and personalized action frames 
based on central events, fulfills all the requirement for an 
organizationally enabled connective action network. 
x Chilean election: Organizationally brokered collective action network. 
Like in most traditional political campaigns, the Chilean election had a 
group of political parties from each coalition seeking to mobilize 
people on Twitter toward their candidates. Basically, they were 
organizations looking to magnify their support and membership. 
The Occupy movement started in October 2011, after a group of protesters 
decided to occupy Zucotti Park in New York. Their primary aim was to 
demonstrate against high levels of inequality and the monetary system 
maintaining inequality. From that initial occupation several occupations took 
place across the United States and beyond. The data for Occupy were 
obtained through the Occupy Research project (www.occupyresearch.net), a 
collaborative network of researchers interested in the Occupy movement. 
They were gathered by R-Shief (www.R-shief.org) using the Twitter 
Streaming API for a period of 13 weeks, following the onset of the 
movement on October 2011. The data contain tweets using the different 
hashtags related to the movement, in particular, those referring to cities where 
RFFXSDWLRQVWRRNSODFH:HIRFXVRQDOOWZHHWVXVLQJWKH³RIILFLDO´KDVKWDJRI
the movement (#ows; N = 4,352,071 tweets). The emphasis on hashtags is not 
without question. Focusing on them allows us to observe only those who had 
a minimal level of involvement in the discussions about the Occupy 
movement. Whereas the use of hashtags relates to a particular group of users, 
those who use them are those who we especially target. 
The IF campaign was a coalition of more than 200 U.K. NGOs seeking to 
put pressure on the G8 governments meeting in the United Kingdom in the 
VXPPHURI7KHFDPSDLJQ¶VIRFXVZDVRQJOREDOKXQJHUDQGVRXJKWWR
get the G8 leaders to make commitments to tackle four underlying drivers of 
malnutrition²insufficient aid and investment, the problem of land grabs, the 
failure to tax multinational companies, and a lack of transparency around 
deals and investment. The data from the IF Campaign were gathered using 
DiscoverText (www.discovertext.com), from January 23 to October 16, the 
official start and end dates of the campaign, using the live feed API. We 
collected tweets that contained the official hashtags used by the campaign 
(e.g., #IF, #IFCampaign, #BigIF, #BigIFLondon, #BigIFBelfast). Given the 
large number of coalition members, we decided to collect tweets using the 
hashtags of campaign as a whole rather than the many organizational twitter 
handles. We anticipated that this would allow us to gather all campaign-
related tweeting, both from the official campaign, member organizations, and 
discussion by the public. The official hashtags were provided in advance by 
the campaign. Because the main hashtag²#IF²was widely used for non-
campaign tweeting we unavoidably collected a high number of non-campaign 
UHODWHG WZHHWV$VVXFK WKHGDWDZHUHFOHDQHGXVLQJ'LVFRYHU7H[W¶VEXLOW LQ
machine classifier (a naïve Bayesian classifier) resulting in a total of 101,842 
units. 
The data for the Chilean election were obtained through the Analitic 
platform (www.analitic.cl ZKLFK XVHV WKH 7ZLWWHU ³*DUGHQKRVH´ $3, :H
collected the tweets related to the two main candidates for this election, 
Michelle Bachelet and Evelyn Matthei. The tweets were selected based on 
the use of the name of the candidates, either as a mention, in hashtags 
FRQWDLQLQJWKHQDPHVRUWKHLUQDPHVZLWKRXWDQ³#´DWWKHEHJLQQLQJ7KLV
approach, unlike using hashtags, has been shown to be more appropriate for 
the analysis of tweets during election campaigns (DiGrazia, McKelvey, 
Bollen, & Rojas, 2013). The time period spanned from 7 weeks before the 
run-off election until December 17, 2013, which covered the entire legal 
campaign period for both rounds (n = 1,556,109 tweets). 
The data sets2 were filtered, leaving the username of the sender, the date 
of the tweet, and any corresponding text. Each data set was then divided into 
weekly static networks, creating a list of all usernames contained within the 
text of the tweets. An edge list was created using the username of the sender, 
and assigning a directed edge to any other usernames mentioned in their 
tweets. To account for more stable relationships among users, we filtered out 
any edges (ties) with a degree less than two. Descriptive statistics for each 
data set is presented in Table 3. 
Measures 
To assess the level of closure for each network, we used the average local 
clustering coefficient metric. This value, for each weekly network, was 
calculated using an algorithm (Watts & Strogatz, 1998) that determines how  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics. 
Week 
IF campaign OWS Chilean election 
Vertices Edges Vertices Edges Vertices Edges 
1 3,334 478 40,223 28,480 94,768 30,682 
2 3,333 478 69,799 86,308 45,156 9,606 
3 1,660 220 42,747 23,483 87,220 16,445 
4 1,514 266 47,067 36,721 83,333 13,607 
5 1,221 162 60,323 71,216 34,261 6,372 
6 1,363 118 42,168 28,564 37,450 9,287 
7 2,637 284 30,793 16,289 68,499 18,115 
8 3,617 711 45,118 35,314   
9 2,176 239 63,185 86,258   
10 380 31 53,687 46,380   
11 932 70 47,361 36,027   
12 932 70 41,153 31,683   
13 1,028 124 25,874 11,585   
14 1,946 111     
15 1,053 116     
16 2,469 255     
17 1,677 523     
18 1,504 190     
19 4,146 728     
20 12,532 3,481     
21 4,813 1,135     
22 347 7     
close a node and its neighbors are to becoming a clique (a graph of fully 
connected nodes). Any graph G = (V, E) formally consists of a set of vertices 
V and a set of edges E between them. An edge eij connects vertex vi with 
vertex vj. The neighborhood Ni for a vertex vi is defined as its immediately 
connected neighbors as follows: 
 ^ `: .i j ij jiN v e E e E     (2) 
Let ki be the number of vertices, ¸Ni¸, in the neighborhood, Ni, of a vertex. 
The local clustering coefficient Ti for a vertex vi is then given by the 
proportion of links between the vertices within its neighborhood divided by 
the number of links that could possibly exist between them. For a directed 
graph, eij is distinct from eji, and therefore for each neighborhood Ni there are 
ki(ki  1) links that could exist among the vertices within the neighborhood. 
Thus, the local clustering coefficient for directed graphs is given as, 
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From this, we can calculate the average local clustering coefficient for all 
the vertices n: 
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7R FDOFXODWH EURNHUDJH ZH XVH %XUW¶V  1HWZRUN &RQVWUDLQW ,QGH[
which measures the lack of structural holes within a network. A structural hole 
exists where two groups in a network are unconnected. The ability to bridge a 
structural hole bestows power on an actor in a network because they can 
valuably control and broker the flow of information between the two groups. 
Constraint is defined as a situation where an actor does not have access to 
structural holes and so cannot benefit from exploiting a brokerage position. To 
JHWDWWKLV%XUW¶VPHDVXUHIRFXVHVRQKRZPXFKWKHFRQQHFWLRQVRIQRGHi are 
concentrated in a single group of interconnected nodes, which in turn constrain 
i¶VDELOLW\WREULGJHDFURVVJURXSV7KLVFDQEHH[SUHVVHGDVIROORZV 
 , ,i ijC c i j 6 z  (5) 
where Ci is the network constraint of i, and cij refers to the dependence of i on j, 
  2 , ,ij ij q iq qjc p p p i q j 6 z z  (6) 
where pij is the proportion of L¶V connections are invested in node j, so that 
ij ij q iqp z z 6 . Here, zij is the measure of the strength of the association 
between i and j, so the constraint of each individual level goes from 0 to 1, 
depending on whether i¶VFRQQHFWLRQVDUHLQYHVWHGLQj. 
Network constraint, as the sum of cij across all i¶VFRQQHFWLRQVSURYLGHVD
measure on how much i is limited by their own network in accessing new 
information coming from other groups (which needs to cross over a structural 
hole). Therefore, constraint will vary according to the size, hierarchy, and 
density of i¶V QHWZRUN &RQVWUDLQW LV KLJKHU ZKHQ VRPHRQH KDV IHZHU
connections that are highly interconnected to each other. The level of 
interconnection can happen directly (pij) between the members of i¶VQHWZRUN²
in a dense network²or indirectly (6qpiqpqj) through a single node²like in a 
hierarchical network. Our networks, in particular, do not present a theoretical 
hierarchy, due to the horizontal nature of the interactions. Unlike work 
environments²WKHRULJLQDOVHWWLQJIRU%XUW¶VZRUN²our cases are less likely to 
present hierarchical structures. To calculate brokerage, we average the node-
specific constraint Ci across the networks to obtain C . 
Both metrics²clustering coefficient and network constraint²are good 
indicators of closure and brokerage. In summary, a higher value on clustering 
coefficient indicates a higher level closure, a lower network constraint values 
indicate higher levels of brokerage. Previous findings (Burt, 2000, 2005) show 
that both measures are associated with higher levels of individual social capital. 
Results and Discussion 
Figures 1 and 2 show the development of closure and brokerage over time for 
each network. Figure 1 shows closure, week by week, in comparison with the 
different theoretical models. The data show that the levels of closure are 
higher (slightly) for the observed networks than for any of the models, in 
each of the three data sets. That is, given the number of edges, vertices, and 
the average degree of the networks, none of the simulated models are able to 
create higher levels of closure. This finding partially supports H2, by 
showing that online networks seem to be more efficient in forming small, 
denser communities than what theory would expect. This suggests that online 
networks are able to produce bonding social capital and their levels of closure 
are not explained simply by random allocation of nodes and ties. 
In the case of network constraint (Figure 1), the support for H2 is also only 
partial. None of the observed networks are able to produce higher levels of 
brokerage than the theoretical models. Moreover, in the case of Occupy, the 
levels of brokerage are even lower than the random graphs. In the case of the IF 
campaign and the Chilean election, brokerage was consistently above the random 
models, which shows that the connections across structural holes present in these 
networks are higher than we would expect on any random network. 
Two points warrant further consideration. First, the presence of brokerage 
opportunities is lower in online networks than the theoretical expectations, 
DQG WKH DELOLW\ RI PHPEHUV¶ RI WKH QHWZRUNV WR FRQQHFW JURXSV DFURVV
structural holes is less efficient that what we would expect. Second, the 
difference between the OWS movement and the other cases raises questions 
about the nature of the events and whether differences in the presence of 
organizations may explain the differential findings with respect to brokerage. 
On top of what we have anticipated in H4, one of the potential reasons for 
this difference is that the Occupy case is less constrained in two particular 
aspects: geography and scope of issues. As has been described by the 
literature (Conover, Davis, et al., 2013), the Occupy Movement reached 
places beyond the United States, but was highly concentrated on local events 
in each city. Moreover, the issues raised by the demonstrators ranged from 
the (rather vague) claim for more equality, to more concrete topics (e.g., the 
change in the financial system) depending on the place of the occupation 
(Castells, 2012; Chomsky, 2012). For these reasons, we performed a second 
set of analyses on the Occupy case. 
 Figure 1. Closure for the three networks. 
Note. The lines are fitted using a local polynomial regression fitting, with D = .5. 
Using the data from two cities in the United States²Oakland and 
Boston²we calculated the levels of brokerage for each network and 
compared it with the simulated networks (using hashtags #OccupyOakland 
and #OccupyBoston, respectively). The aim of this analysis is to establish 
whether the trend of low brokerage is something inherent to the Occupy 
movement, or was simply less evident in the wider, (inter)national network 
given its diffuse set of issue concerns and sizable geographic constituency. 
We expect that the Oakland and Boston chapters of Occupy will show higher 
levels of brokerage (in relative terms) than the broad-based Occupy/#OWS. 
 Figure 2. Brokerage for the three networks. 
Note. The lines are fitted using a local polynomial regression fitting, with D = 0.5. 
Figure 3 shows the results for both networks. In the case of Boston, the trend 
was exactly the same as in the OWS networks: brokerage was lower than any 
of the theoretical models, including the random simulations. The difference is 
statistically significant and is consistent with the results from the general 
Occupy movement. The case of Oakland, however, shows more disparate 
results. The results remain different at a p < .05 level, which means that the 
observed values differ significantly from the simulations, however, the results 
show no clear trend over time. The observed networks show, at points, even 
higher levels of brokerage than most of the models (with the exception of WS), 
and during other weeks the brokerage is lower than the simulations. 
 Figure 3. Brokerage for Oakland and Boston. 
Note. The lines are fitted using a local polynomial regression fitting, with D = .5. 
Looking at the results more closely, the weeks where brokerage is lower 
are those where the number of edges is higher. This is consistent with the 
idea that more ties within a limited network will eventually work against the 
existence of structural holes. Nevertheless, this does not answer the question 
of why the levels of brokerage are consistently lower in the other Occupy 
data sets, but not in this one.3 After accounting for geographical conditions, 
we believe that these results support H4, that is, that organizations play a key 
role in fostering brokerage in collective action networks. 
In summary, we find only partial support for H2 with respect to closure: 
Online networks are able to foster the creation of tight, small groups within 
the network and do so better than what would be predicted if random. With 
respect to brokerage, the story is twofold. On one hand, the IF campaign and 
the Chilean election networks show similar results (as in closure), whereas 
the OWS networks do not show any more brokerage than what we might 
expect at random. In the case of the Occupy, this result was tested with 
smaller groups within the Occupy movement, but with disparate results. 
Our results showing differences in brokerage between OWS and the other 
two cases warrants further consideration. Beyond the more technical 
inferences about the differing results, we argue that OWS may differ 
substantively from the other two cases. Both the Chilean election and the IF 
campaign are highly organized, well-funded, and tightly focused events. 
Given that the main aim of campaign communications, Twitter or otherwise, 
is to influence attitudes, preferences, or vote choice, we would expect to see a 
KLJKHUQXPEHURIRUJDQL]DWLRQVKLULQJ³SURIHVVLRQDOEURNHUV´WKDWLVSHRSOH
whose main job is to connect the different supporters of a given candidate, 
transmit information from the campaigns, and engage potential supporters. 
Moreover, the election itself was narrow in focus with two main events: the 
first round and the run-off election. This means that the professional brokers 
not only had a goal but also a deadline to focus their resources and efforts. 
Similarly, IF was a coordinated campaign focusing on a small number of key 
events and issues. Each of the participating organizations, though varied in 
their level of resources, may have served as professional brokers whose 
primary aim was engaging the sector and the broader public by transmitting 
relevant information across them. 
On the other hand, the OWS movement was more organic in its origins. 
7KH GHPRQVWUDWRUV WKHPVHOYHV WULHG WR IRVWHU WKH LGHD RI D ³OHDGHUOHVV
UHYROXWLRQ´ DQG DLPHG WRNHHSPRPHQWXP IRU D ORQJSHULRGRI WLPH7KHUe 
were few singular events that served to focus their resources and activities 
and the way in which they organized, both locally and globally, was 
explicitly designed to foster egalitarian and horizontal interactions. Analyzed 
at a more local scale, the results from the Occupy show different patterns. 
Although in some cases the trend was similar to the aggregate movement, in 
other cases, local networks show higher levels of coordination and inter-
group interaction. After accounting for geographical conditions, we believe 
that these results support H4, that is, organizations play a key role in fostering 
brokerage in collective action networks. 
To test our first hypothesis, that the three observed networks are different 
from random, we compared the mean scores for closure and brokerage for the 
random simulations against each network. The results²in Online Appendix 
A²show that in most cases, the difference between observed and random 
networks is not due to chance, providing strong support for H1. 
For H3, the results are consistent with our expectations. In all three events 
analyzed, the correlation between brokerage and closure is positive.4 The 
detailed results can be found in Online Appendix B, along with figures for 
each of the networks. We used both parametriF 3HDUVRQ¶V R) and non-
SDUDPHWULF .HQGDOO¶V W) measures of association to test the hypothesis. In 
summary, brokerage and closure appear to be positively correlated in all three 
cases, although it becomes weaker in the case of the OWS data set, mainly 
for the above discussed reasons. 
The findings from the OWS, the IF campaign and the Chilean election 
provide a compelling account of the formation of social capital online. The 
three cases show patterns of behavior that cannot be explained fully by the 
most widely used theoretical models nor respond to mere random allocation 
of nodes and ties. In sum, the data suggest evidence of social capital 
formation online. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have provided initial evidence of the formation of social 
capital in RQOLQHQHWZRUNV:H UHWXUQ WR3XWQDP¶VFRQFHSWVRIERQGLQJDQG
bridging social capital in reviewing our findings. With regard to bonding 
social capital, online interactions appear to bring together like-minded 
people, and create small, dense groups among them. That is, the potential of 
ICTs to create bonding social capital is better than of the theoretical models. 
On the positive side, this means that online networks may have more 
potential than we expected to foster the creation of trust and reciprocity, 
based on the idea of intra-group ties. However, this may also lead to what 
3XWQDPFDOOV³F\EHUEDONDQLVDWLRQ´NHHSLQJOLNH-minded people together, and 
not allowing the members of the groups to be exposed to more diverse 
information, while excluding those outside of them. 
In terms of the bridging social capital, the results are conditional. It seems 
that the presence of organizations and professional brokers in the networks 
allows for bridging across structural holes. That is, the formation of bridging 
social capital seems possible by the presence of people whose aim is to 
produce those ties. The connection between small groups does not occur 
randomly or organically. In essence, this is not much different than what we 
would expect according to Bennett and SegHUEHUJ¶V W\SRORJ\ 7KH DOOHJHG
horizontal and spontaneous nature of online interactions might not be enough 
to produce, without intention, bridging social capital. Moreover, these results 
VXSSRUW *LEVRQ DQG 0F$OOLVWHU¶V ILQGLQJV DERXW WKH SUHYDOHQFH RI ERQding 
over bridging social capital in online environments. Our tests using 
observational networks²instead of self-reported data²SURYLGHV DQ ³DFLG
WHVW´IRUWKHYHUDFLW\RIWKHLUFRQFOXVLRQV 
Putnam also claims that healthy societies foster the formation of both 
bonding and bridging social capital in coordination. One is required for the 
presence and operation of the other, and as such, the interplay between them 
creates trust, appreciation for diversity, and communication among different 
social groups. Our results show that online interactions are able to produce 
the same positive interplay. Furthermore, the evidence presented also 
provides support to the idea that this positive interplay requires intentionality. 
Online social capital seems to be in the right direction, allowing and fostering 
the coordination between bridging and bonding social capital. However, this 
is also present in events where part of the ethos of the network is the 
communication across people from different groups. 
We have focused our attention here on the online social architecture, the 
networks of twitter connections and conversations, to test whether we observe 
evidence for patterns of bridging and bonding social capital. One thing we have 
not tested is whether the content of the conversations and connections provide 
evidence for social capital in the sense of building trust and norms. This, in our 
view, is the clearest and most pressing area for future research. There is an 
important distinction between the thinner, transactional view of connective 
action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) and the thicker, transformational view of 
social capital. The crucial next step is to understand if, when, where, and how 
FRQQHFWLRQVEHJHWSRVLWLYHVRFLDOH[WHUQDOLWLHVDQGKHOSIRUPWKH³VRFLDOJOXH´
of Putnam (2001). In this light, we see our more modest and structural 
contribution here as a necessary first step in this endeavor. Because social 
FDSLWDO FDQQRW H[LVW LQ ³WKH HWKHU´ EXW UHTXLUHV VRFLDO ERQGV²online or 
offline²we argue that we have provided the necessary, but not sufficient, first 
step in understanding whether social capital exists in online networks. 
This article has attempted to provide a preliminary approach to the 
formation of social capital in online contexts, by analyzing three different 
Twitter data sets. Our findings suggest that the current theoretical expectations 
of how social connections are created and maintained are not able to explain 
the network structure of online social interactions. Furthermore, on the question 
of the existence of social capital in online settings, we fall on the side of 
caution. Online connections seem able to easily create bonding social capital, 
but they require a concentrated effort to create bridges across those groups. The 
ideal setting presented by Putnam, where bonding and bridging social capital 
operate in conjunction, requires intention and effort. 
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Notes 
1. Bridging and bonding social capital may not be sufficiently nuanced categories 
for characterizing online interactions, given the absence of cues that help to 
structure group formation in face-to-face environments. Before developing more 
nuanced categories, however, it is useful to determine whether traditional 
conceptualizations are present. 
2. Each data set contains the text of the tweet, date, and time, the user who sent it 
(username and user identification number), and relevant metadata, such as 
location and the profile image of the sender. 
3. As a plausible explanation, we could argue that Occupy movements radicalized in 
smaller, not mainstream cities, might benefit from more local, offline organization. 
Hence, the levels of brokerage might look more dynamic and higher. 
4. As explained above, the way in which network constraint is measured is such 
that higher levels of brokerage is expressed in lower levels of network constraint. 
For that reason, we use 1 C . 
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